Joined cases Mio and Konektra have allowed the EU Court of Justice, in a ruling of 4 December 2025, to further clarify the copyright protection of works of applied art and its relationship with design protection. Clarification in this context was particularly needed, as Member State rulings continue to show significant disparities on that point. The Court also addresses the assessment of originality and the threshold applicable to findings of copyright infringements.
Background
Both the Mio and Konektra cases concern alleged copyright infringements involving works of applied arts.
In Mio, Swedish designer and manufacturer of furniture Asplund brought an action against Mio, a Swedish furniture retailer, for infringement of copyright. Asplund found that the dining tables that Mio was manufacturing, marketing and selling were strongly similar to its own, which should be protected by copyright as works of applied art. The court of first instance upheld Asplund’s claims. In Konektra, similarly, the Swiss company USM initiated proceedings against Konektra, a German retailer selling spare parts for USM’s modular furniture system, alleging infringement of its copyright. The court of first instance found in favour of USM’s claims.
In both cases, appeals were lodged, which led the Stockholm Court of Appeal and the German Federal Court of Justice to refer questions to the EU Court of Justice (CJEU) for a preliminary ruling on the copyright protection of works of applied art and on the assessment of the requirement of originality in that context.
Findings of the Court
On the relationship between copyright and design protection of works of applied art
According to the CJEU, the first question of the referring court in Mio is whether there is a relationship of rule and exception between design protection and copyright protection, such that, when assessing the originality of works of applied art, it is necessary to apply stricter requirements than are laid down for other types of works.
In this regard, the Court recalls its previous Cofemel case, in which it had held that both protections could be granted cumulatively to the same work, but only in specific situations. The Court clearly distinguishes both regimes, which present differences in terms of conditions for and duration of protection, due to their different rationales.
As such, the Court confirms that there is no automatic connection between the grant of design and copyright protection, but also highlights that there is no relationship of rule and exception between them: the originality of works of applied art must be assessed according to the same requirements as those used to assess the originality of other types of subject matter. No stricter rules may apply.
On the assessment of the originality of works of applied art
The Court then clarified how national courts must assess the originality of works of applied art.
It first recalls its previous case law, which defines originality as the expression of free and creative choices reflecting the personality of their author. It then cites its Brompton Bicycle precedent, in which it had clarified that utilitarian objects satisfying the condition of originality may be eligible for copyright protection, even if their realisation has in part been dictated by technical considerations, provided that this has not prevented the author from reflecting his or her personality in the object. It is the national courts’ role to determine whether an author has made choices that are free and creative, such choices not being presumed. The Court also recalls that the aesthetic or artistic visual effect of the object cannot in itself determine whether the requirement of originality has been met.
As to the relevance of the author’s intentions during the creation process, the CJEU finds that these intentions may be taken into account when determining originality, but only in so far as the author has expressed them in the work concerned. The Court infers this from the wording of its case law, in particular the terms “reflects” and “expression”, and the requirement that the subject matter be identifiable.
Likewise, other elements such as sources of inspiration, the use of already available shapes, the likelihood of a similar independent creation, or subsequent recognition of the work by the industry may be taken into consideration by national courts, but are not necessary or decisive to determine whether the work is original.
With regard to the threshold for copyright infringement
The Court, lastly, clarified certain aspects of the assessment by national courts of copyright infringements.
The Court stresses that, in order to establish copyright infringement, the same overall visual impression is not sufficient. National courts must determine whether there has been an unauthorised use of original creative elements of the protected work, and whether they have been reproduced in a recognisable manner. A comparison of the overall impression created by both works cannot be decisive in that regard (since that criterion concerns the protection of designs).
Moreover, the extent of protection does not depend on the degree of originality/creative freedom exercised by the work’s author. If a work is original, it must enjoy copyright protection which cannot be inferior to that to which any copyright protected work is entitled.
Regarding inspired works, the CJEU emphasises that the author of the newer work can only invoke the protection of ‘new’ creative elements. In addition, following the same artistic trend as the author of an earlier work does not constitute an infringement unless specifically identifiable creative elements of the earlier work have been reproduced.
Lastly, as regards similar independent creations, national courts must assess whether such a similar independent creation does in fact exist, taking into account all the relevant aspects of the particular case. The mere possibility of such a situation cannot however justify to refuse copyright protection.
Conclusion
While this ruling is not surprising in view of the CJEU’s previous case law, it usefully clarifies that utilitarian works are subject to the same copyright law standards as any other works. This clarification is particularly timely, as there existed major disparities between Member States regarding the protection under copyright law of objects already protected under design law (as illustrated by recent German and French rulings, respectively denying copyright protection for Birkenstock sandals and granting such protection for Hermès handbags).
It also provides more tools to assess originality in works of applied art and the existence of copyright infringement, which is especially significant within the field of design, where many creations adhere to the same prevailing trends.
Nonetheless, questions still remain (and arise) after this judgment and will undoubtedly continue to result in lengthy discussions before national courts.