The Court of Justice rules that fundamental rights in EU law are capable of producing horizontal direct effect

Type d'actualité
Legal news

The judgment rendered by the Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice on 17 April 2018 in Vera Egenberger (C - 414/16) is particularly interesting on two counts.

First, the Court of Justice rules that, in the event of a dispute, it should be possible for a national court to make a balancing exercise between the right of autonomy of churches, on the one hand, and the right of workers not to be discriminated against on grounds of religion, on the other hand. The Court recalls that both of these rights are recognised by the Anti-Discrimination Directive (i.e. Directive 2000/78/EC).

In this context, the national courts must ascertain whether the requirement of religious affiliation for a post within the Church is necessary and objectively dictated, having regard to the ethos of the church concerned, by the nature of the occupational activity in question or the circumstances in which this activity is carried out. In addition, the requirement must comply with the principle of proportionality.

Second, the Court affirms unequivocally that the rights to non-discrimination and effective judicial protection enshrined, respectively, in Articles 21 and 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (hereinafter the “Charter”) are capable of producing horizontal direct effect.

Indeed, the Court recalls first that the national courts are bound to interpret the national law transposing an EU directive, as far as possible, in conformity with that directive and that, in the case where it is not possible to do so, they have to disapply the national law. In the present case, the Court rules that the national courts must ensure the judicial protection deriving for individuals from the prohibition of all discrimination on grounds of religion or belief and the right to effective judicial protection. Both rights which are enshrined in the Charter are sufficient in themselves to confer on individuals a right which they may rely on as such in disputes between them and other individuals in a field covered by EU law.

For further information on this case and/or for general legal advice relating to the fundamental principles of EU Law, please contact Pierre de Bandt or Raluca Gherghinaru.